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Abstract
This paper sets out to explore the relationships between institutional constraints and predictability in
geopolitical forecasting. Despite the increasing complexity of our world today, researchers have found that
institutional rules and norms still function to influence human behavior, and, therefore, the presence of well-
functioning institutions may lead to greater stability and certainty in predicting world events.
Using forecasting data from the Good Judgment Project’s recent prediction tournaments, we test the change
in predictability—including accuracy, confidence, and difficulty—against the experimental constraints of
diplomatic ties, rule of law, effective democracy, trade dependence, and freedom of the press. Our hypothesis
is that each of these institutions, together and in conjunction with one another, are effectively able to
constraint power player political behavior and reduce uncertainty in the geopolitical realm.
We find that all of the constraints, except for diplomatic ties, actually have a negative correlation with
prediction accuracy. Democracy is the strongest negative correlation between the level of constraint and
prediction accuracy. We propose that one possible explanation for this result is due to a potential quadratic
relationship between democracy and predictability, such that countries who are transitioning from autocracy
actually become less predictable than those that are autocratic. Further research in a larger sample set is
needed to test this new hypothesis.
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Abstract  
This paper sets out to explore the relationships between institutional constraints and 
predictability in geopolitical forecasting. Despite the increasing complexity of our world 
today, researchers have found that institutional rules and norms still function to influence 
human behavior, and, therefore, the presence of well-functioning institutions may lead to 
greater stability and certainty in predicting world events. 
Using forecasting data from the Good Judgment Project’s recent prediction 
tournaments, we test the change in predictability—including accuracy, confidence, and 
difficulty—against the experimental constraints of diplomatic ties, rule of law, effective 
democracy, trade dependence, and freedom of the press. Our hypothesis is that each of these 
institutions, together and in conjunction with one another, are effectively able to constraint 
power player political behavior and reduce uncertainty in the geopolitical realm 
We find that all of the constraints, except for diplomatic ties, actually have a negative 
correlation with prediction accuracy. Democracy is the strongest negative correlation 
between the level of constraint and prediction accuracy. We propose that one possible 
explanation for this result is due to a potential quadratic relationship between democracy 
and predictability, such that countries who are transitioning from autocracy actually become 
less predictable than those that are autocratic. Further research in a larger sample set is 
needed to test this new hypothesis.  
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Introduction to the Topic 
We are living in the Information Age, characterized by a universal reliance on 
research studies and immediate news coverage. Technology is providing humans with the 
capability to overcome barriers of time, distance, location, and physical human capacities in 
order to process information and make decisions. An increasing percentage of activity in the 
developed world has shifted into the “knowledge economy” whereby production and service 
offerings rely more heavily on intellectual capabilities than physical inputs or natural 
resources.  The ability to exploit what management gurus call “big data” has permeated the 
way business, economic, and political strategists endeavor to accurately model the future 
and pursue courses of action which are statistically most likely to provide a desirable 
outcome. 
Yet, across every academic discipline and economic sector, we continue to observe 
significant error in predicting future states of the world. This trend even holds true for so-
called experts who are hired on the basis of their ability to calculate potential opportunities 
and threats. While some prediction errors are trivial in the grand scheme, many ensue 
considerable financial losses to the hard-earned dollars of organizations, investors, and 
taxpayers. Even graver are the human consequences that can result from forecasting failures, 
such as consequences from unexpected political coups, ethnic genocides, market failures, 
and natural disasters. More accurate prediction of geopolitical events such as these has the 
potential to save not just money but also human livelihoods. Places which are the most 
vulnerable to unpredictable circumstances seem to incur them the most often. 
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Researchers have begun to explore what actually constitutes good judgment in 
forecasting future events and why experts are often wrong in their forecasts.  Four years ago, 
with some of these questions still left unanswered, an experiment called the Good Judgment 
Project set out with a mission to “harness the wisdom of the crowd to forecast world 
events.”1 What could everyday people like you and me know about nuclear bombs and 
economic downturns? It came as a shock to many that the average forecasts of amateur 
individuals have been surprisingly accurate. 
The Good Judgment Project 
The Good Judgment Project (GJP)  is a four-year research study begun in 2011 by 
psychology and management professors Phillip Tetlock, author of the award-winning Expert 
Political Judgment; Barb Mellers, an expert on judgment and decision-making; and Don 
Moore, an expert on overconfidence. The GJP was supported by research teams at the 
University of Pennsylvania and the University of California Berkeley including experts in 
psychology, economics, and statistics.  
The GJP was organized as part of a government forecasting tournament sponsored by 
the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA) division of the US Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence. The specific tournament is IARPA’s Aggregative Contingent 
Estimation Program (ACE), which aims "to dramatically enhance the accuracy, precision, and 
timeliness of forecasts for a broad range of event types, through the development of 
                                                        
1 Tetlock, Phil, Barb Mellers, and Don Moore. "Welcome to the Good Judgment Project." The Good Judgment Project. 
N.p., n.d. Web. 10 May 2015. 
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advanced techniques that elicit, weight, and combine the judgments of many intelligence 
analysts."2 In essence, the goal of this initiative was to source better ways of collecting and 
manipulating raw forecast data to in order to ultimately improve the government’s 
performance in geopolitical forecasting.  
In 2011, the inaugural year of the ACE tournament, the GJP asked hundreds of people 
to join its team and help predict the likelihood of a broad set of nearly 200 global events that 
were of interest to the U.S. intelligence community. The GJP’s international group of 
forecasters signed up voluntarily and represented a diverse range of careers, backgrounds, 
and levels of expertise. The GJP beat out four other university-based groups in that year’s 
tournament, taking the raw individual forecast data and using sophisticated aggregation 
algorithms to combine them into the most accurate crowd-sourced forecasts possible. By the 
end of the tournament’s second year, the GJP team had performed so well that it became the 
only group to receive IARPA funding for the remainder of the ACE program.3 
Each year, the GJP strives to improve its aggregate forecasts, implementing new 
strategies including cognitive and psychological training and introducing knowledge-
sharing teams in addition to continually improving its algorithmic model. The successful 
strategies of the GJP can and have been used by the US Intelligence Community to improve 
the government’s ability to forecast global events. The massive quantities of prediction data 
                                                        
2 Rieber, Steve. "Aggregative Contingent Estimation (ACE)." Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA). 
US Office of the Director of National Intelligence, n.d. Web. 10 May 2015. 
3 “The Good Judgment Project: Improving Intelligence Estimates to Support Decision-makers." CHIPS Technology 
Magazine. US Department of the Navy, Spring 2015. Web. 11 May 2015. 
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collected by the GJP provide an unparalleled opportunity for deeper analysis on how we can 
go about improving our country’s ability to forecast. 
Motivation  
The art and science of prediction are deeply nested in the fields of international 
development and diplomatic relations. As a future professional within these disciplines, my 
ability to rely on proven rational and statistical models to precisely anticipate future global 
events will be critical to the success of any initiative I intend to pursue. The extent to which 
global leaders are able to design effective solutions for political peace in Syria, adequate 
health and sanitation in Bangladesh, and agricultural sustainability in Angola will depend 
heavily on the predictions of geopolitical forecasters to inform the allocation of resources 
and risks to where they might be most productive. 
I believe that the findings from this study have great potential to inform the methods 
and techniques that intelligence analysts will be taught to employ as they engage in the 
formation of probabilities and conjectures regarding significant global events. More accurate 
predictions from these experts will ultimately enable decision-makers from across all 
sectors of society to make more efficient use of limited resources and become more effective 
in safeguarding the lives and livelihoods of human persons. 
We hypothesize that individuals who forecast on a regular basis as part of their 
profession can be taught to make better predictions by improving their dissecting of 
forecasting prompts—real or experimental. Historical analysis of past predictions enables 
us to study where we have gone wrong (or right) and adjust our future strategy accordingly. 
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The identification of relevant institutional protocols and normal which constrain geopolitical 
outcomes is an important first step to understanding predictability. Essentially, if we can 
uncover specific question tags including countries, regions, or question types or 
combinations thereof which have seen statistically significant unpredictability, we should be 
able to improve our strategy going forward. 
By analyzing both the correlation and potential causation between a question 
properties and the prediction quality of forecasters within the Good Judgment Project, we 
might uncover previously unknown insights into the most effectual cognitive strategies for 
achieving optimal results. If we succeed in our goal, we will be one step closer to the optimal 
training frontier in preparing accurate forecasters of global events. 
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Literature Overview 
Making accurate predictions in a world of increasingly complex geopolitics is a skill 
that brilliant minds from every academic discipline have sought to pinpoint. In particular, 
political scientists and international relations theorists have endeavored for centuries to 
explain the randomness of global events with a plethora of models, theories, and 
frameworks. While they have greatly improved the human ability to understand and 
articulate the complex nature of geopolitics, there has been little concrete progress in the 
way of anticipating future world events. 
A common answer to this unsolvable problem is that of complexity theory which 
understands that processes having a large number of independent agents will interact and 
order themselves spontaneously into a coherent and stable system of behavior.  Complexity 
theory which suggests that “organizations” (such as the sphere of international politics in 
the case of this paper) cannot be conceptualized in a linear or additive frame of mind. Instead, 
numerous experts agree that complex structures must be understood as both dynamic and 
adaptive. The theory also implies that such complex behavior is for the most part 
unpredictable and uncontrollable. The rapid pace of communication and evolving 
technologies today only serves to further entangle the interconnected web of actors within 
a constantly-changing global system. 
Political scientist Stanley Feder suggests that creating prediction models, however 
nonlinear and intricate, still cannot replace what is to be learned by real-world experience 
in political science: “Analytical methods alone will not guarantee that policy makers and 
academics will not be surprised by political events. Preventing surprise depends on asking 
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the right questions.”4 Feder argues that the basic value of a geopolitical forecasting lies in 
preventing surprises as opposed to attempting to pinpoint certainty, which is both futile and 
counter-productive. One can and should prevent surprises by becoming familiar with each 
of the moving parts in a complex system and understanding the norms of how a change in 
one influences a change in another, rather than attempting to predict the aggregate outcome 
of so many individual actions and motivations.  
In geopolitics, these moving parts are often understood to be a wide range of relevant 
actors, from heads of state, to the military, to businessmen, to leaders of diplomatic entities. 
Our standard definition of complexity theory would seem to suggest that rather than having 
all of the power in the hands of a single actor, increasing the number of stakeholders 
interacting in a given situation will disperse the base of power, ultimately resulting in greater 
political stability. According to the international politics researcher Neil E. Harrison, 
decentralized decision-making further increases complexity. In his book Complexity in World 
Politics, Harrison writes that “complexity views politics as emerging from interactions 
among interdependent but individual agents within evolving institutional frameworks.”5 
The idea of institutions providing some guiding structure to the chaotic world of 
complexity theory is important to social science theory. Douglas North, a Nobel Prize-
winning economist from the New Institutional Economics (NIE) school, defines institutions 
as the “the rules of the game” of a given society which are humanly-devised and govern 
                                                        
4 Feder, Stanley A. "FORECASTING FOR POLICY MAKING IN THE POST–COLD WAR PERIOD."  5 (2002): 111-25. 
Web of Science. Web. 1 May 2015. 
5 Harrison, Neil E. Complexity in World Politics: Concepts and Methods of a New Paradigm. Albany: State U of New 
York, 2006. Print. 
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human interaction. Institutions can include both formal constraints such as statue law, 
common law, regulation as well as informal constraints including conventions, norms of 
behavior, and self-imposed codes of conduct.6  Arguing for the theory of institutional realism, 
political scientist Robert Graftstein proposes that individuals actively choose to participate 
in pre-existing institutions which reduce uncertainty and transaction costs. 
While the various theories regarding institutions (historicism, realism, etc.) have 
been widely discussed and debated in political science literature, current scholarship has not 
yet closed the gap to approaching a clear and comprehensive understanding of how the rules 
and norms provided by institutions can play a role in increasing predictability. These 
institutional “constraints” as North defined then seen to follow Feder’s notion of forecasting 
not as an exercise to pre-determine the outcome, but rather understanding what norms do 
exist amidst the complexity that are likely to influence its behavior in a certain way. Thus 
strong institutions with programmed patterns of behavior may be able to serve as 
instruments of prediction in an otherwise complex system. 
In the case of geopolitical forecasting, it is common to think of domineering political 
power players who make bold actions facing little to no constraint on their authority. 
Complexity theory suggests that the more actors who are involved in sharing authority with 
these power players will tend the collective outcome toward a “coherent and stable” system 
of behavior. Strong macro-level institutions can perhaps be those actors who not only 
disperse power away from a concentrated source but who also incorporate constraints in 
                                                        
6 North, Douglass. "The New Institutional Economics and Development." Washington University St. Louis (1993): n. 
pag. Print. 
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the form of laws and norms on a power player’s otherwise rogue behavior and bring an 
entire community toward a more predictable outcome. 
A wealth of research describes the nature of specific political and social institutions 
and how each operates through a combination of formal and informal norms to influence 
human behavior and interaction. A detailed analysis of the each of these types of institutions 
and their relative effectiveness is beyond the scope of this paper. We identified five well-
researched global institutions which we intuitively believe may be capable of constraining 
power players from igniting geopolitical stress, either actively (invading a neighbor’s 
border) or passively (not controlling the growth of insurgency). If the institutions we have 
chosen to test fulfill their duty as effective constraints, geopolitical forecasting will become 
much more predictable in their presence.  
The first experimental constraint, diplomatic ties, reflects research suggesting that 
international organizations can serve either a coercive or a support role for individual 
countries, as long as they comply with rigorous standards. The second, rule of law, consider 
studies which contrast corrupt and unjust legal institutions with those that are strictly bound 
to treat all men and women equal under the law. The third, effective democracy, implies 
the (historically-proven) potential for protest, impeachment, or even revolution in the even 
that a leader is acting in the explicit interests of the people. Fourth, trade dependence, 
echoes an ever-widening body of research suggesting that countries who rely almost 
exclusively on other nations for their revenues may be economically forced to enter into 
certain relationships. Finally, freedom of the press alludes to the widespread reputational 
damage which can quickly occur if a leader acts in a way that others, even small social groups, 
deem to be unfavorable.  
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Research Methodology 
In brief, this paper will utilize linear regression methods to analyze numerical and 
descriptive data from the Good Judgment Project forecasting records, testing for 
relationships between observed levels of predictability and details of question content (both 
direct and indirect). Specifically, this paper endeavors to answer the following question:  
Are there certain institutions which are able to consistently constrain the 
agency of a power player into a more predictable pattern? 
A more detailed description of research methodology follows in the subsections below. 
 
Sample of Observation 
 The majority of the data to be studied in this analysis come directly from the Good 
Judgment Project records itself. The Good Judgment Project question database and 
forecasting results is a place where we can begin to generate hypotheses about 
predictability. Given the wealth of data we have available, it should be very worthwhile to 
compare the questions forecasters predict well with those they predict poorly. Specifically, 
this paper will observe forecasting questions which “closed” during Year 3 of the GJP, 
conducted from August 2013 to May 2014. (All questions run for a pre-specified time frame, 
after which the final predictions of each forecaster will be scored.) Extreme outlier questions 
which were removed from analyses conducted by the GJP research team were also take out 
of this data set. Furthermore, due to the research method chosen for this paper, questions 
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which did not identify one or two primary countries as subjects in the prompt were also 
eliminated. These initial data-cleaning measures left a sample of approximately 130 
questions to test. 
 Each of these questions were identified by direct characteristics (country actor and 
question family) as well as indirect characteristics (relevant institutions). These descriptive 
measures formed the independent variables for these regressions. The dependent variable 
was determined to be observed predictability, based on forecaster performance in our 
sample set of GJP questions. We created three distinct measures of predictability (difficulty, 
confidence, and accuracy) to be tested in these regressions. The analysis will be primarily 
driven by a simple one-by-one linear regression of each of the dependent variables—
difficulty, confidence, and accuracy—on each of the independent variables—country actor, 
question family, and institutional constraint and interpreting the results.  
Prediction Data 
 Before discussing the formulation of variables, it is important to understand how 
predictions are actually submitted to the tournament. Almost all forecasting questions are 
created to be binary, such that one answer is correct and one answer is incorrect and there 
is no room for ambiguity in between. The questions are constructed around a specific time 
frame in the real world; whether the hypothetical event does or does not happen by a 
specifically identified date, will determine the outcome of the question, and thus whether an 
individual forecast is correct or incorrect.  
 While the questions are binary, the responses are more flexible. Forecasters are 
invited to submit a probability percentage ranging from 0% to 100% for each event which 
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they are predicting. For example, if I am certain that an event will occur, I will answer 100%; 
if I am less certain, but still fairly confident, I might answer 80%. If I am completely clueless, 
I would consider answering 50% as it sits perfectly in the middle of a yes or no response. 
When scores are calculated to assess how correct the predictions were, there is a function 
that considers not only if a forecaster was on the correct side of 50% but also how far from 
100% or 0% his or her prediction was. 
It is also important to take into consideration that, in this tournament, predictions on 
a single question are made over a long time horizon, with a possibility to change your 
prediction during the duration of the question. Unlike the expert difficulty measurement 
which must be taken ex ante, measurements which are derived from an individual’s forecast 
can be seen as flow variables rather than stock variables. Typically in the GJP, variables such 
as these are reported as longitudinal weighted averages. (For example, if I score a 1 for 50% 
of the duration of the question, 0.5 for 25% and 0.25 for the remaining 25%, my overall 
reported score on this variable would be 1*0.5 + 0.5*0.25 + 0.25*0.25 = 68.75). Moreover, 
there are over 1000 forecasters in Year 3 of the tournament, a large sample which—in the 
spirit of the “wisdom of the crowds” theory—affords the opportunity for us to average the 
individual forecasting variables that correspond with each question for a more robust 
indicator of overall trends occurring. 
Dependent Variables 
 Our research intends to test and compare the level of predictability of different post-
mortem geopolitical forecasting questions in order to develop new insights regarding the 
anticipatory prediction of global events in the real world. The notion of predictability is 
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generally understood as the degree to which a correct prediction or forecast of a system's 
state can be made either qualitatively or quantitatively; however, it is a complex idea that is 
actually quite hard to conceptualize and thus to concisely articulate. Precisely for this reason, 
we have chosen to identify and test three distinct notions of predictability—difficulty, 
confidence, and accuracy—to assess the phenomenon of predictability more carefully. 
 The variable of question difficulty aims to pinpoint how easy or hard a certain 
question is to predict, assuming a forecaster has all of the relevant information. These ratings 
of question difficulty are collected from subject-matter experts who place each question on 
a seven-point scale ranging from most to least difficult to accurately predict. The measure 
we will formulate for expert difficulty will be a mean of all expert difficulty ratings assigned 
to a certain question. Here high values (7) will denote that the question is easy and low values 
(1) that it is difficult. The rating task is done ex ante to avoid hindsight bias; however, this 
makes the rating task particularly challenging because, in effect, we are asking experts to 
predict unpredictability.  
 Following this logic, the variable of forecaster confidence intends to understand with 
how much certainty each prediction was made.  Like predictability, the qualitative notion of 
confidence can take on a number of nuanced quantitative meanings. For the purposes of this 
analysis, we chose to create a scaled confidence index which would incorporate the 
statistical measures of extremity, entropy, and variance. For each of these variables (as 
stated in the paragraph above), we will take the weighted mean across all days the question 
is open and standardize it such that the variables have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation 
of 1. From these values, we create the confidence composite variable which is calculated as 
follows: scaled confidence index = mean extremeness – mean entropy – mean variance. 
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Extremeness is an evaluation of the distance of one’s prediction from 50%. If a 
forecaster predicts a 0% or 100% outcome, it can be assumed that the individual is quite 
confident in the outcome he or she has chosen, whereas a 50% prediction implies maximum 
uncertainty. High variance among the entire pool of forecasters denotes a lack of collective 
confidence, while low variance suggests that the majority of forecasters are in relative 
agreement. Finally, statistical entropy measures the dispersion of forecasters along the 
range of 0% to 100% outcomes. Entropy is highly correlated with variance, but rather than 
considering the range between forecasters (as variance does), entropy considers the location 
of dense pockets of similar predictions or very sparse ranges of very few predictions as a 
distinct way of assessing uncertainty. Because extremeness is an indication of confidence, 
and variance and entropy suggest a lack of confidence, the index measure has been 
formulated to subtract standardized variance and entropy values from the standardized 
extremeness value—a high index value represents confidence. 
The final, and perhaps most intuitive, approach to assessing predictability is 
considering the accuracy of geopolitical forecasters in answering each question correctly. 
As mentioned previously, the forecaster’s score for each question awarded on the basis of 
“ending up on the right side of 50” as well as the certainty of each prediction. For example, if 
an event occurs, and my prediction was 100%, I will get the maximum score for that 
individual question. The technique used to make this method of assessment work is called a 
Brier Score, a measure which includes both an assessment for the correct outcome (i.e. +/-
0.5 for a binary question) and certainty or that outcome (i.e. distance from 0.5) and then 
taking a weighted average of a single individual’s predictions across the duration of the 
question in case the predictor chose to update along the way, as most do. 
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The Brier Score traditionally reports a 0 as the best score and 1s and 2s to be very 
poor showings, so for the sake of consistency with other dependent variables, we will use 
the reverse of the Brier Score for the purposes of this analysis. The reason that accuracy 
cannot be our only measure of predictability is because the use of Brier Score as the 
dependent variable limits our analysis to only post-mortem evaluations, given that one 
cannot calculate the Brier Score until after the time frame for the question closes. 
Predictability, however, is a relevant factor before the outcome of a question is known; this 
understanding is captured by the previous measure of confidence. Moreover, Brier Score is 
not a perfect predictive mechanism for understanding real world geopolitical conclusions 
because the Brier scoring treats errors of under- and over-prediction as equally bad. 
Independent Variables 
The direct independent variable which is easiest to identify is “country actor.” All of the 
forecasting questions which were left in our data set after its initial cleaning had one or two 
countries identified in the context of the prompt. In the case of two country actors (e.g. Will 
Iran and Russia *officially sign an agreement regarding the exchange of oil for goods and 
services before 10 May 2014?), we originally set out to repeat the question twice in our data 
set—once with each country as the primary actor. Doubling the presence of certain 
questions, however, created misleading results in the data, so instead we chose to identify 
the “least constrained” country as the primary actor (more explanation to follow on 
constraints below). After identifying the country actor in each question, we also assigned 
each question to one of the following seven regions: North America, Latin America, Europe, 
Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast & East Asia.  
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The second direct variable we created, “question family,” was more subjective to 
identify. The GJP questions in our records had already been (subjectively) tagged with one 
of 18 question groupings, but this would have proven too granular for our small group of 
130 observations. After carefully studying all of the questions in our data set, the following 
families were identified as mutually exclusive and collective exhaustive: conflict, domestic, 
economic, negotiation, and leader change. A number of the old question groupings were 
channeled directly into one larger question family (e.g. all questions previously identified as 
“Elections” or “Leader Entry/Exit” both became identified as “Leader Change” in the new 
family scheme.) 
Conflict questions included the subjects of war, border aggression, deployment of troops, 
short-term ceasefire agreements, and nuclear threats. Domestic questions referenced local 
policy and legislative concerns, internal country factions and insurgency, national 
emergencies, and human rights issues including disease and refugees. Economic questions 
explored trade agreements, monetary policy, sovereign debt, interest rates, and commodity 
markets. Negotiation questions referenced international agreements, treaties, sanctions, and 
long-term peace talks. Finally, leader change questions included the topics of election 
fairness and results, political coups, and the removing or vacating of office for any reason. 
The final independent variable is an indirect measure called an “institutional 
constraint” and is the primary measure that will be used to test our research question. The 
following section will describe the intuition and construction behind the creation of this 
unique variable.  
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Identifying Constraints 
Following our review of the literature, we hypothesize that each of the following 
institutions may have the influence to limit the power of a given political actor and thus 
reduce the scope of acceptable choices and corresponding outcomes for his/her action: 
diplomatic ties, rule of law, effective democracy, trade dependence, & press freedom. By 
limiting the range of viable outcomes in a given geopolitical scenario, these institutions act 
as constraints on the behavior of a single powerful actor (in our analysis here, we identify 
the country itself as this actor). The presence of these classified institutional constraints 
(both independently and in conjunction with one another) we hypothesize will ultimately 
decrease the level of unpredictability for a given geopolitical outcome. 
In order to scientifically evaluate how these proposed constraints can impact 
geopolitical predictability, it is critical that we measure these constraints as thoughtfully, 
systematically, and objectively as possible. For this reason, all constraints will be fit to a 0-
100 scale in order to standardize values for the purpose of statistical analysis. We have also 
chosen to assign the relevant level of institutional constraint to the current political 
dynamics of each country (that is, to our primary actor in the geopolitical scenario). It is 
critical that each relevant constraint be linked to the country in question rather than the 
question itself because our hypothesis assumes a change in the power held by a country’s 
predominant political actor as civic institutions grow stronger and begin to disperse power 
away from the government. Our choice to organize data in this way also leaves our analysis 
open to the (likely) possibility that the central political figure or national regime of a 
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particular country changes; by assigning the institutional constraint index to a country, new 
leaders will not be misrepresented by the qualities of their predecessor.  
Five Institutional Constraints 
Diplomatic ties or diplomacy act as a constraint on political power when 
international pressures place limits on local or national sovereignty. We measure this 
constraint using data from the Center for Systemic Peace and its Integrated Network for 
Societal Conflict Research (INSCR). The index is constructed based on the following data: 
Memberships in Conventional Intergovernmental Organizations (CIO), 
country data coded every fifth year, 1952-1997, denotes individual country 
membership in a) federations of inter-government organizations (1); b) 
universal membership organizations (39); c) inter-continental membership 
organizations (52); and d) regionally-defined membership organizations 
(288); characterized by “autonomous international governmental 
organizations of a non-profit nature”7 
This index has not been updated since 1997, however, it still should represent a useful tool 
for our analysis. There has been relatively little fluctuation in relevant IGO membership over 
the course of the past 20 years given that the major organizations were created much earlier 
in the 20th century. 
The rule of law acts as a constraint on political power because it constitutes a civil 
order, strong legal enforcement, and just prosecution. We measure this constraint using the 
                                                        
7 "Memberships in Conventional Intergovernmental Organizations." Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research 
(INSCR). Center for Systemic Peace, n.d. Web. 1 May 2015. 
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Rule of Law index created by the World Justice Project. The index is constructed based on 
the following data: 
The WJP Rule of Law Index offers a detailed, multidimensional view of the 
extent to which countries adhere to the rule of law in practice. The Index 
measures the rule of law using 47 indicators organized around 8 themes: 
constraints on government powers, absence of corruption, open government, 
fundamental rights, order and security, regulatory enforcement, civil justice, 
and criminal justice.8 
Unfortunately, this index is an incomplete indicator because it only includes data analysis 
compiled for 99 countries. A number of nations that are frequently identified as subjects in 
geopolitical forecasting questions (including Syria, North Korea, and the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo) are not evaluated or assigned a Rule of Law ranking by this index. 
Other potential rule of law indices we considered utilizing (but that were not as robust as 
the WJP) had identified all three of these countries near the very bottom of their lists, so we 
have taken the liberty of assigning these three nations each with an approximate rule of law 
score of 30, which is near the bottom of the range for this index. 
Independently from the rule of law, effective democracy can also act as a constraint 
on political power because it evokes unrestrained participation and agency expressed by the 
citizenry. We will measure this constraint using the Democracy index created by The 
Economist. The index is constructed based on the following data: 
The Democracy Index is based on five categories: electoral process and 
pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political 
participation; and political culture. Based on their scores on a range of 
                                                        
8 "Rule of Law Index 2014." WJP Rule of Law Index. The World Justice Project, n.d. Web. 1 May 2015. 
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indicators within these categories, each country is then categorized as one of 
four types of regime: “full democracies”; “flawed democracies”; “hybrid 
regimes”; and “authoritarian regimes.”9 
This data set is complete, robust, and up to date. 
 Meanwhile in the economic sphere, trade dependence serves as a constraint on 
political power to the extent of the international goods and commodities trade across 
countries. We will measure this constraint using the Merchandise Trade as a percentage (%) 
of GDP index source from the World Bank. The index is constructed based on the following: 
Merchandise trade as a share of GDP is the sum of merchandise exports and 
imports divided by the value of GDP, all in current U.S. dollars. Merchandise 
trade only includes trade in goods, not services nor capital transfers and 
foreign investments.10 
This data set is complete, robust, and up to date. In some instances 2014 data was not 
available, so we inserted 2013 numbers as a close approximation. 
Finally, we include freedom of the press as a constraint on political power which can 
be assessed by the extent, accuracy, and honesty of local media and reporting coverage. We 
will measure this constraint using the World Press Freedom index created by the Reporters 
Without Borders. The index is constructed based on the following data: 
The Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index ranks the 
performance of 180 countries according to a range of criteria that include 
media pluralism and independence, respect for the safety and freedom of 
                                                        
9 "Democracy Index 2013." Economist Intelligence Unit. The Economist, n.d. Web. 1 May 2015. 
10 World Bank. Data Catalog: World Development Indicators. Merchandise Trade as a share of GDP. From WB National 
Accounts Data and OECD National Accounts Data. N.p., 2014. Web. 1 May 2015. 
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journalists, and the legislative, institutional and infrastructural environment 
in which the media operate.11 
This data set is also complete, robust, and up to date. 
 We can imagine other “institutions” which might act as constraining factors on the 
range of acceptable political activity as well. For example, reliance on foreign aid, religious 
homogeneity, and progressive social values can undoubtedly limit the agency of individual 
political leaders to act completely freely. For the purposes of this analysis, however, we chose 
to focus on constraints that are characterized by institutions which are likely to share the 
same realm of political power with the country’s Head of State, or another lead national 
actor. Each of these institutions identified above would be considered legitimate civic actors 
which can have a broad impact reaching nearly all citizens, if the institution is strong.  
Practice examples of these for each identified constraint might be the United Nations, the 
judiciary system, the electoral system, capitalist market forces, the popular press.  
Applying Constraint Weights 
Yet, while it logically follows to assign these constraint indices to each individual 
country, we need to still take into account the content of the question itself in evaluating a 
certain event’s predictability. Different institutional constraints will not necessarily apply 
equally to different questions. For example, for a question regarding a possible upcoming 
election, the level of effective democracy in a country is going to be a much more relevant 
potential constraint than the level of trade dependence. 
                                                        
11 "World Press Freedom Index 2014." Reporters Without Borders. N.p., n.d. Web. 1 May 2015. 
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Table 1: Summary of Institutional Constraints and Accompanying Indices      
INSTITUTION COUNTRY INDEX 
Diplomatic Ties 
Conventional IGO Membership 
(Center for Systemic Peace) 
Rule of Law 
Rule of Law Index 
(World Justice Project) 
Effective Democracy 
Democracy Index 
(The Economist) 
Trade Dependence 
Merchandise Trade as % of GDP 
(World Bank) 
Press Freedom 
World Press Freedom Index 
(Reporters without Borders) 
 
To this end, we chose to create an additional variable which attempts to quantify the 
qualitative traits of the content in each particular forecasting question for the purposes of 
our analysis. Essentially, this variable will act as a multiplier to ensure that the constraints 
relevant to each question are given enough weight in determining predictability, while those 
that are not particularly relevant are not overemphasized. 
We call this variable question relevance, and it will be decidedly orthogonal to the 
country-linked institutional constraint variables described in the previous section. In 
practice, this means the relevance of each identified constraint is assessed independently of 
the country in question (i.e. as if the country name was not given). The most systematic way 
to accomplish this goal will be to automatically assign quantitative question relevance values 
based on the previously referenced qualitative question family variable, thus avoiding a 
more haphazard approach to assigning relevance based on each individual question.  
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Table 2: Institutional Constraint Weightings Assigned by Question Family 
 INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS 
QUESTION 
FAMILIES 
DIPLM RULAW DEMOC TRADE PRESS 
Conflict 2.0 1.5 2.0 1.5 1.5 
Domestic 1.5 2.0 2.0 1.5 2.0 
Economic 1.5 1.0 1.0 2.0 1.0 
Negotiation 2.0 1.5 1.0 1.5 1.5 
Leader Change 1.0 2.0 2.0 1.5 1.5 
 
The weighting will be assigned on a three-point scale. A “1.0” will indicate that a 
forecasting question’s outcome will not likely be influenced by this constraint. A “1.5” will 
indicate that a forecasting question’s outcome is likely to be influence by this constraint. A 
“2.0” will indicate that a forecasting question’s outcome will be significantly influenced by 
this constraint. Essentially, we are aiming to determine to what extent this constraint 
actually affects this type of question. The following example question illustrates why this 
weighting is necessary for our analysis: Will inflation in Japan reach 2 percent at any point before 
1 April 2014? For a prompt like this which falls in the Economics question family, it is easy to see that 
Press Freedom is unlikely to be an influential constraint for this question. On the flip side, Trade 
Dependence will be a significant constraint in questions that determine the future of Japan’s 
economy. By assigning these weights to each constraint, we are strengthening the robustness of our 
analysis to test for correlation between institutional constraints and predictability.  
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We will summarize our full variable methodology in the following example forecasting 
question, illustrated by the inset to the right. After isolating each question, we identify the primary 
actor country (and associated region) and then 
sort each question into one of five question 
families. From there, we refer to our external 
indices such as the Economist Democracy 
Index to determine the country actor’s score 
on each of the five institutional constraints we 
are testing (all scores are scaled from 0-100). 
Finally, we multiply each located constraint 
value with the appropriate weighting based on 
its question family. This final weighted value, 
which you see on the far right of the table, will 
be our primary independent variable in this 
analysis.  
Limitations of Investigation 
This investigation faces one important potential limitation in that the amount of data 
observations to be used in conducting this analysis is limited by the quantity of forecasts 
conducted by the Good Judgment Project. With a smaller sample size, correlations must be 
particularly high in order to be statistically significant. This also means that the potential 
relationships identified as a part of this analysis may be essentially false positives when 
considered outside the scope of this data set. With this limitation in mind, the GJP and I 
recommend that the results to be discussed in the following section be understood as 
Will there be a significant lethal confrontation 
between armed forces from Russia and 
Ukraine in Crimea before 1 April 2014? 
 
29 
 
correlations recognized within the GJP-specific context that provide a starting point for 
forecasting hypotheses which can later be tested in the broader field of political science with 
a larger scale and scope of data collection.  
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Statistical Results 
The initial analysis tested for predictability—difficulty, confidence, and accuracy—
against the weighted institutional constraint variables designed for this analysis. Our 
institutional constraint variables turn out to be poor predictors of prediction difficulty 
(measured by the expert difficulty rating) and prediction confidence (measured by a 
composite variable of forecaster extremeness, variance, and entropy). Out of our three 
dependent variables, prediction accuracy (measured by the Brier Score indicator) turned out 
to be much more highly correlated to weighted institutional constraints on average.  
In contrast with our hypothesis, however, the overall effect was found to be negative 
rather than positive. In other words, while our initial assumption was that the presence of 
these institutions would constrain political actors and thus make forecasting questions more 
predictable, our data suggest instead that the more institutionally constrained a question is, 
the less likely it is to be predictable. The sum of all weighted constraint values (“total”) 
showed a small correlation with accuracy (r =-0.15, t(110)=-1.80, p=0.07). In fact, with 
varying strengths of correlation, all of the constraint variables we tested were negatively 
associated with accuracy, except for diplomacy which was observed to have a slight positive 
correlation with accuracy. The strongest of these negative correlations was for democracy (r 
=-0.19, t(110)=-2.00, p=0.05), suggesting that as the level of democracy in a country 
increases, forecasters have an increasingly hard time make accurate predictions. 
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Table 3: Statistical Output of Predictability Measures against Institutional Constraints 
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Focus on Accuracy 
 These findings that contradicted our initial hypothesis led us to look deeper into the 
relationship between prediction accuracy and weighted institutional constraints. Our 
additional independent variables of geographic region and question family offered an 
opportunity to subset the data to observe the correlations between accuracy and 
institutional constraint more closely.  
 The correlations become larger and more significant when looking at smaller subsets 
of data. When looking across geographies, we see that within the subset region of Southeast 
and East Asia—which includes numerous questions on China, Japan, the Koreas, Thailand, 
and Myanmar—there is a fairly strong negative correlation between prediction accuracy and 
the “total” existence of institutional constraints (r =-0.34, t(32)=-2.08, p=0.05), observing a 
particularly significant relationship with democracy  (r =-0.36, t(32)=-2.19, p=0.04), 
 
Table 3: Statistical Output of Accuracy against Institutional Constraints by Region Subset 
 
 We can also analyze the correlations subdivided by question family. The most 
significant results from this analysis are located within the domestic question family, which 
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again include the topics of local policy and legislative concerns, internal country factions and 
insurgency, national emergencies, and human rights issues including disease and refugees. 
Within this question family, there is a statistically significant negative correlation between 
prediction accuracy and the “total” existence of institutional constraints (r =-0.38, t(32)=-
2.30, p=0.03) as well as with the rule of law constraint in particular (r =-0.41, t(27)=-2.36, 
p=0.03). This breakdown suggests that domestic question accuracy tends to be negatively 
correlated with the presence of institutional constraints, whereas economic question 
accuracy is positively correlated with the presence of institutional constraints.  
Table 4: Statistical Output of Accuracy against Institutional Constraints by Family Subset 
 
As an aside, the output in Table 4 above also calls attention to the potential for 
positive correlation between rule of law and democracy, which indeed does exist very 
strongly (r =0.83, t(95)=14.70, p<2.2e-16). While these two indices appear to be somewhat 
redundant, a deeper look into the data confirms the relevance of keeping them both as 
separate constraints. After each institutional constraint index is adjusted such that it scales 
from 0-100, we observe that some nations like Iran have a much higher rule of law than 
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democracy score (44.34 vs. 19.80 respectively) whereas countries like India have a much 
lower rule of law than democracy score (47.71 vs. 79.20 respectively). Once again, the 
democracy constraint seems to create a lot of questions within this analysis, thus we dedicate 
the following section to the exploration of democracy as an institutional constraint and a 
potential agent for geopolitical predictability.  
The Democracy Question 
The significant negative correlation between institutional constraints (particularly 
democracy) and prediction accuracy was a surprising finding which deserves more in-depth 
analysis. Rather than trying to deduce conclusions from statistical analysis, the method of 
inductive reasoning may provide a better window into helping us understand this somewhat 
counter-intuitive result. As the initial goal of this study was to identify the content qualities 
which made certain questions more predictable than others, we return to conduct an 
inductive analysis on the questions themselves.  
We being looking at the five highest accuracy questions in the data set: 
1. Before 1 May 2014, will Iran abolish the office of President of the Islamic Republic?  
2. Before 1 May 2014, will General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi announce that he plans to stand 
as a candidate in Egypt's next presidential election?  
3. Will Syria's *mustard agent and key binary chemical weapon components be 
destroyed on or before the 31 March 2014 deadline established by the Executive 
Council of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)?  
4. Before 1 May 2014, will China *attempt to seize control of Zhongye Island?  
5. Will the six-party talks with North Korea resume before 1 May 2014? 
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The prompts come from a wide variety of question families, but we observe that all five of 
them are housed in the geographic regions of the Middle East or Southeast / East Asia. Most 
of these countries (North Korea, Syria, Iran, etc.) are actually highly unstable which seems to 
follow from our preliminary finding that institutional constraints and prediction accuracy 
are negatively correlated. 
Next, we select on the dependent variable for all questions which have a reverse Brier 
Score (accuracy measure) of >0.998 to obtain a slightly larger sample of the 17 most 
accurately predicted questions in our data set. This subset is likely too small and too biased 
to interpret any results as statistically significant; nevertheless it could be a useful tool for 
dissecting the data further. We run the initial thread of analysis exploring the relationship 
between prediction accuracy and “total” institutional constraints and find that, indeed, the 
negative correlation is even stronger between the two within this subset (r =0-.45, t(16)=-
2.02, p=.06), further reinforcing our initial result. 
We do the same with the five lowest accuracy questions in the data set: 
1. Before 1 January 2014, will the Prime Minister of Japan visit the Yasukuni Shrine?  
2. Will Viktor Yanukovich vacate the office of President of Ukraine before 10 May 2014? 
3. Before 1 May 2014, will Chinese armed forces or maritime law enforcement forces 
attempt to interdict ... vessel or airplane that it claims is in its territorial 
waters or airspace?  
4. Which of the following will occur first with regard to the state of emergency declared 
by the government of Thailand on 21 January 2014?  
5. Which party will win the largest number of seats in the next elections for Colombia's 
Chamber of Representatives?  
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This time a number of geographic regions are represented, but there is a potential pattern in 
the question families, with two prompts falling in the domestic category and two in the 
leader change category, 
Next, we select for all questions which have a reverse Brier Score <0.75 to again 
obtain a sample of the 17 least accurately predicted questions in our data set. With an even 
stronger result in this subset relative to the previous one, the negative correlation between 
accuracy and “total” institutional constraints is observed (r =-0.52, t(16)=-2.44, p=.03). 
Moreover, among the subset of least accurately predicted questions, the constraints of rule 
of law and democracy present a particularly strong negative correlation—(r =-0.71, t(12)=-
3.47, p=.005) and (r =-0.57, t(16)=-2.76, p=.01) respectively. Acknowledging that this final 
step of analysis is both biased from selecting on the dependent variable and limited due to 
its very small sample size, it is safe to say that this investigation may contribute some 
additional strength to our original surprising result that the presence of institutional 
constraints, and democracy, in particular, make it harder for forecasters to accurately 
predict future geopolitical events. 
Summary of Findings 
This research project was focused on identifying patterns based on the content 
characteristics of geopolitical forecasting questions that may make them more predictable 
for geopolitical forecasters (both amateur and professional) in the future. The goal of this 
study was to generate hypotheses within the realm of forecasting data that could possibly 
form the basis for future political science theories.  
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The most noteworthy finding from this study is that the presence of institutional 
constraints is negatively associated with prediction accuracy. Diplomacy was the only 
constraint tested which seemed positively correlated with accuracy, suggesting that perhaps 
political actors in countries which are party to numerous international treaties (as this 
metric tests) do actually feel a restriction in their ability to pursue “unpredictable outcomes.” 
All other constraints tested were negatively correlated with prediction accuracy across a 
number of different statistical analyses run. The particularly strong negative relationship 
between democracy and predictability offers a hypothesis for further research in the future. 
Lastly, prompts located in the region of Southeast and East Asia and the question 
family of “domestic” were seen as fairly unpredictable relative to other question in this data 
set, so future forecasters would do well to note this observation and consider exercising 
greater caution on prediction questions which include these two categorizations.  
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Possible Interpretation 
Can democracy really make things less predictable? This is a question to be answered 
by a future paper. Nonetheless, our data from this study allow us to make a brief conjecture 
regarding this initially surprising finding. We begin by reviewing our chosen indicator for 
this particular institutional constraint—The Democracy Index, created by the Economist 
Intelligence Unit—which incorporates an assessment of a country’s electoral process and 
pluralism, civil liberties, functioning of government, political participation, and political 
culture.12 Why would a country that scores higher on these factors be subject to so much 
unpredictability? 
 
Table 5: The Economic Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index 2013 
The Democracy Index --- Highest / Lowest States of Democracy 
Norway 99.3 North Korea 10.8 
Sweden 97.3 Central African Republic 14.9 
Iceland 95.8 Chad 15.0 
New Zealand 92.6 Equatorial Guinea 16.6 
Denmark 91.1 Syria 17.4 
Switzerland 90.9 Dem. Rep. of the Congo 17.5 
Canada 90.8 Saudi Arabia 18.2 
Finland 90.3 Turkmenistan 18.3 
Australia 90.1 Guinea-Bissau 19.3 
 The Netherlands 89.2 Iran 19.8 
 
                                                        
12 Democracy Index 
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A potential explanation lies in the nature of the forecasting tournament data itself. 
Prediction prompts, which are designed to be challenging, are much less likely to include 
countries like Norway and Canada (which are highly democratic) as they are to include North 
Korea and Syria (which are highly undemocratic). In fact, the average democracy score 
across all 167 countries surveyed was 55.5 (after our scaling mechanism from 0-100), but 
the average unweighted country democracy score assigned to all questions in our data set 
(n=129) was 44.3. This reference point suggests that the most democratic countries tend to 
be underrepresented in forecasting tournament data.  
Looking back on our inductive analysis of the most and least predictable questions, 
we see evidence to suggest that questions referencing the least democratic countries (North 
Korea, Syria, Iran, etc.) are surprisingly well-predicted by forecasters. Questions that are 
most poorly predicted, on the other hand, seem to fall in the middle ranges of the Democracy 
Index—again, according to our previous inductive analysis, these would be nations like 
Colombia, Thailand, and the Ukraine. All of these data points begin to build a hypothesis that 
perhaps it is not the most democratic countries that are the least predictable, but rather the 
most democratic countries in our forecasting data set which actually represent more a 
middle-democracy group of countries than one that is truly high-democracy countries. 
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This hypothesis is reminiscent of an economics model known as the Kuznets curve. 
In his landmark 1955 paper, Economic Growth and Income Inequality, Nobel laureate Simon 
Kuznets introduced a theory that while poor societies start off relatively equal, as their 
economies grow, they are subject to 
increasing inequality as employment 
models shift to adjust to changing external 
circumstances such as industrialization.  
Eventually, however, as the economy 
develops further, this inequality is reduced 
again, as the market adjusts to its new 
normal standard of activity. 13 
The resemblance between this phenomenon and that which we experience in our 
own data set—namely, that both the most and least democratic states appear to be the most 
predictable—implies that there may perhaps be a similar quadratic equation that could help 
explain the relationship between relative levels of state democracy and the predictability of 
geopolitical events. We will test this postulate by fitting the Brier score (not reversed) 
prediction accuracy measure of against the level of (unweighted) national democracy as 
determined by the index.  Each individual question will serve as a unique data point.  
After plotting all of the data points and fitting a quadratic polynomial to the 
observations, we detect that there may indeed be a curvilinear relationship between 
                                                        
13 Kuznets, Simon. "Economic Growth and Income Inequality." American Economic Review 45.1 (1955): 1-28. JSTOR. 
Web. 01 May 2015. 
Image 1: An illustration of the Kuznet’s Curve 
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predictability and democracy as follows from the similar economic model planted by 
Kuznets in 1955. In our limited data set, however, the relationship is weak (R² = 0.0254, y = 
-8E-05x2 +0.0089x - 0.0568), and there are likely to be many other factors which play a role. 
It is worth noting that forecasting data is intended to be non-linear, or even, in this case, non-
quadratic, as the goal of these tournaments is to pose distinctly unpredictable questions to 
the participants. Thus, even a small observed relationship such as this one could warrant a 
very interesting and explanatory study when real world data is incorporated. 
Image 2: Geopolitical unpredictability as a function of national democracy levels 
 
In closing, I suggest that more research be done on the evolution of democracy in 
emerging political powers and how this progression could perhaps be a source of local 
instability and thus geopolitical unpredictability. The idea of a turbulent democracy in 
transition has been promoted by many scholars, including Edward Mansfield and Jack 
Snyder who assert that in such nations “mass politics mixes with authoritarian elite politics 
in a volatile way” that can lead to wars, aggression, and other negative political 
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consequences.14 Such a hypothesis would also fits our data results in this paper suggesting 
that questions falling within the “domestic” family are among the least predictable along with 
questions located on Asian nations like China and Thailand—both of which are frequently 
referenced as countries undergoing a (long) process of democratization. Among the BRICS 
and MINT countries, which are generally cited as nations undergoing serious economic 
transition, we observe from the graph below that each of them is situated somewhere along 
the process of democratization as well—a condition which may perhaps be a contributing 
factor in their frequent mention in geopolitical news. 
 
Image 2: States in economic transition as a function of national democracy levels 
 
                                                        
14 Mansfield, Edward D., and Jack Snyder. "Democratization and the Danger of War." International Security 20.1 
(1995): 5. Harvard University. Web. 1 May 2015. 
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Conclusion  
Summary of Paper 
This paper set out to explore the relationships between institutional constraints and 
predictability in geopolitical forecasting. Despite the increasing complexity of our world 
today, researchers have found that institutional rules and norms still function to influence 
human behavior, and, therefore, the presence of well-functioning institutions may lead to 
greater stability and certainty in predicting world events. 
Using forecasting data from the Good Judgment Project’s recent prediction 
tournaments, we tested the change in predictability—including accuracy, confidence, and 
difficulty—against the experimental constraints of diplomatic ties, rule of law, effective 
democracy, trade dependence, and freedom of the press. Our hypothesis was that each of 
these institutions, together and in conjunction with one another, would be effectively able to 
constraint power player political behavior and reduce uncertainty in the geopolitical realm 
We found that all of the constraints, except for diplomatic ties, actually had a negative 
correlation with prediction accuracy. Democracy was the strongest negative correlation 
between the level of constraint and prediction accuracy. We proposed that one possible 
explanation for this result is due to a potential quadratic relationship between democracy 
and predictability, such that countries who are transitioning from autocracy actually become 
less predictable than those that are autocratic. Further research in a larger sample set is 
needed to test this new hypothesis.  
 
44 
 
Opportunities for Future Research 
 Beyond furthering the democracy hypothesis presented in the conclusion, there are 
a number of other research projects that could follow this paper. As was mentioned 
numerous times throughout this paper, the small and very particular sample of data used in 
this analysis is sufficient for hypothesis generation but not true hypothesis testing. Future 
research could be done to expand the validity of this study from the forecasting world into 
the real world through a choice of parallel data points that form a part of empirical political 
science research.  
 In addition, a number of additional variables could be incorporated into this analysis 
to better understand the role that institutions can play in encouraging or diminishing 
question predictability. Some suggestions on the individual forecaster level include 
education background and cognitive/political science training to gain a better 
understanding as to the knowledge base with which each forecaster is operating. Another 
interesting study would be to test the time spent researching, collecting new information, 
and updating each forecast as a measure of how well the forecaster understands the complex 
power dynamics taking place.  These variables, though harder to measure, would add a 
significant component to the study of predictability based on specific question details.  
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